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Abstract: Policies such as Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP) which aim to assist 
farmers with biomass production may act as a double-edged sword. On one hand, they 
lure farmers to adopt biomass production in the short term. On the other hand, they can’t 
be irresponsible for farmers’ abandonment of biomass production in the long run. The 
paper sharpens this idea in a principal-agent setting and argues that by offering a timely 
loyalty premium the agents’ take-and-run behavior can be mitigated. Moreover, the 
model shows that effort and investment in human capital are increasing in loyalty 
premium when agents decide to continue providing biomass after testing-water contract 
expires.  
 
















To reduce the dependence on foreign oil and alleviate the environmental pollution, the 
U.S. government has mandated the development of renewable substitutes of oil (Thorsell 
et al. 2004). The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 have mandated that 36 
billion gallons per year of ethanol be produced in the U.S. by 2022, with 21 billion 
gallons per year from cellulosic feedstock other than corn (U.S. Congress 2007). 
Different from the traditional corn-based ethanol production, cellulosic biorefinery faces 
supply issues. Besides high production and transportation costs identified from 
production literature, Altman, Sanders and Boessen (2007) found that asset specificity 
exists in the biomass supply chain. Biomass producers invest in specialized equipment 
for harvest, collect, storage and transport. Some biomass such as switchgrass is dedicated 
to bioenergy production. Alternative use is limited to be burnt to power electricity plant. 
Due to the absence of a spot market for switchgrass, uncertainty associated with 
production and potential hold-up by the biorefinery, farmers are not willing to produce 
switchgrass on their land. On the other hand, the biorefinery invests in asset specific 
processing facility, power plant, and processing technology. For example, specialized 
enzymes are developed to break down certain biomass. Switching to other biomass would 
require high “re-pooling” of the current enzymatic process. Farmers who realize that the 
biorefinery who invests in huge sunk cost must have enough switchgrass for year round 
operation may gauge switchgrass price and act opportunistically. Gow and Swinnen 
(2001) found that large firms and co-ops are more likely to breach the contract though the 
transaction cost of dealing with them is lower than with small firms. In short, both the 2 
 
biomass suppliers and the biorefinery can behave opportunistic due to the investment in 
specific assets and uncertainty. 
Klein and Crawford (1978) suggested vertical integration and contract can be used to 
solve the opportunistic behavior. Currently, the Department of Energy and private 
investments granted 19 integrated biorefineries in 15 states. In some state level and 
private-owned biorefineries, contracting is prevalent. In 2008, University of Tennessee 
(UT) Switchgrass Farmer Incentive Program offered farmers with $450 per acre per year 
for switchgrass production on 3-year contract. Being offered a fixed rate contract based 
on acreage, farmers are fully insured against price risks; however, in the meantime, they 
are induced to implement less effort such as using the less productive land for 
switchgrass production. POET, the largest ethanol producer in the world, signed four-
year contract with farmers for corn cobs to a pilot-scale cellulosic ethanol plant in 
Emmetsburg, Iowa. Short-term contract can’t solve the opportunistic behavior as the 
vertical integration or long-term contract does (Klein and Crawford, 1978). Dubois and 
Vukina (2009) studied the effects of contract duration on agents’ behavior in a principal-
agent setting. They argued that increase in contract duration increases both investment 
and effort, and consequently production. This finding echo of research of Joskow (1987) 
who pointed out that long term contract is used when large quantity (a feature of 
dedicated asset) is transacted in the contractual relationship. However, they didn’t explain 
the reasons of the change from short term contract to long term contract. 
In 2008, USDA Farm Service Agency initiated the Biomass Crop Assistance Program 
(BCAP) to assist owners and operators of agricultural and non-industrial private forest 
land to establish, produce, and deliver eligible biomass feedstocks to biomass conversion 3 
 
facility. The BCAP offers up to five years establishment payment and annual payments 
and up to two years matching payments for eligible annual and non-woody perennial 
crops. Song, Zhao and Swinton (2009) used a two-way conversion model to study 
farmer’s decision to adopt switchgrass and found that government subsidies such as 
BCAP on motivating conversion to switchgrass production reduce the land shares for 
switchgrass in the long run. BCAP acts as a double-sided sword to induce biomass 
production. On one hand, it along with other subsidies lures farmers to adopt biomass 
production. On the other hand, it may foster farmers to switch back to traditional 
enterprises when the subsidy effects are gone. Bull (1987) studied explicit long term 
contract in labor market. He found that pension and retirement bonus acts as self-
enforcement capital are crucial for the existence of such explicit long term contract.  
In this study, I’m providing additional support to Song, Zhao and Swinton’s argument 
that policies such as BCAP may discourage biomass production in the long run, but only 
under certain conditions. Moreover, I argue that not only the amount of subsidies matters, 
but the distribution/timing of subsidies matter in promoting biomass production. I’ll first 
illustrate it in a simple engine oil change example. I have two options for engine oil 
change. I can either go to Ms. Wang or Dr. Qin. Assume that I only need five times oil 
change for the life of my car. Ms. Wang offers first time customer a $10 off coupon and 
no ending bonus. The regular price is $35 per oil change at Ms. Wang. Dr. Qin has flat 
rate $30 per oil change for all periods. Optimal strategy is to go to Ms. Wang in period 1 
and switch to Dr. Qin for the following four oil change. This is what I call Take-and-Run 
behavior. Now, Ms. Wang offers a free oil change in the fifth service. Optimal strategy 
becomes to go to Ms. Wang in all periods for oil change. However, if I only change the 4 
 
distribution/timing of Ms. Wang’s pricing, the result will change again. Swapping Ms. 
Wang’s first period price and last period price as shown in Table 1, Take-and-Run occurs 
again. Now suppose I need six times oil change for the life of my car. Ms. Wang offers 
first time customer a $10 off coupon and a free oil change in the sixth oil change service. 
Dr. Qin still has flat rate of $30/service. I would still go to Ms. Wang for all six times. I 
keep adding the times of oil change I need for my car and I keep going to Ms. Wang for 
all times until I need nine times of service for my car. As can be seen, the duration I go to 
Ms. Wang for oil change not only depends on the amount of the discount, but the 
distribution/timing of the discount.  
The BCAP has similar features with Ms. Wang’s new customer discount. Without long 
term incentives such as ten-year loyalty premium or twenty-year retirement bonus, 
farmers may take advantage of the BCAP and switch to other production when BCAP 
effect vanishes. What should the biomass conversion facility do if farmers take and run 
when BCAP expires? One possible strategy is to add an ending loyalty premium or 
redistribute some of the initial subsidies as credible loyalty premium to induce them to 
enduringly supply the biomass conversion facility. Another question is when to provide 
the ending bonus. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as following: Section 2 develops a Take-and-Run Model to 
demonstrate the conditions for underinvestment in both human capital and physical assets 
when take-and-run occurs. Section 3 shows the timing of ending subsidy. Section 4 
proposes testable hypothesis. Section 5 summarizes results and conclusion. 
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2 Take-and-Run Model 
The model is based on Dubois and Vukina (2009). Two types of investments -
unobservable human capital   and observable physical capital   - are defined in their 
principal-agent setting. The investment in physical capital such as a baler is discrete.   = 
1 if the agent invests in a baler while   = 0 if the agent doesn’t invest in a baler. This 
investment is irreversible and only incurs a fixed cost normalized to 1 and paid when 
acquired. The unobservable investment   in specific knowledge increases the stock of 
specific knowledge   and costs            The stock of knowledge depreciates at rate   
but increases additively with investment   such that            , where    is the 
previous period investment.  
In addition to these two types of investments, the agent also supplies an unobservable 
productive effort  . The cost of effort depends on knowledge   as given by         
  
  , 
which implies that specific knowledge   reduces the marginal cost of effort.  Physical 
investment   raises the productivity of effort such that the production function is given 
by                  where   is a production shock unknown at the time where efforts 
are exerted, with                . The contract payment      is assumed to be linear 
in principal predetermined parameters   and  , i.e.,                where   is the piece 
rate payment and   is the base payment when no output is delivered. 
Based on this setting, I add two types of government subsidies in the analysis: initial 
fixed costs subsidy and piece rate subsidy and ending loyalty premium. Hipple and Duffy 
(2002) found that farmers are hesitating to make long term commitment before testing the 
water. Hence, instead of dynamic setting, I assume that there’re only two stages of 6 
 
biomass production. The decision to enroll in biomass production in short term and the 
decision to continue in biomass production are separate so that they can be solved 
independently. In the first stage, farmers choose whether to enroll in a short-term biomass 
production. In the second stage, they choose whether to renew.  
The expected utility in Stage I is given by:  
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By fixed point theorem, there exists a unique solution for   
    
From now on, I consider the risk neutral agent. Risk attitude complicate the analysis and 
I’ll deal with in future work if possible. 
Optimal investment in human capital and effort are derived from (2) and (3): 7 
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inconsistent with the observation. Farmers with large farms can be considered as risk 
neutral. They invest large amount of money in equipment as well as in human capital 
such as learning how to operate the machine to increase productivity. They may gain 
economies of scale and scope, but they spend more effort on management and taking care 
of large acreage. Farmers with small farms may or may not invest in equipment.   
Expected utilities from investing in physical asset and from not investing in physical 
asset are: 
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To enroll in the BCAP, the expected utility from optimal actions must be at least equal to 
the reservation utility such as growing corn or CRP, i.e.,                      
    
                                          
                    8 
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Proposition 1: To enroll in BCAP when the sum of the base payment and the actual fixed 
cost (fixed cost minus corresponding subsidy)  don’t exceed the reservation utility, the 
minimum initial human capital stock (  ) is decreasing in                   , and 
increasing in      Optimal stock of specific knowledge and effort in Stage I are increasing 
in                    
Proof of Proposition 1: see Appendix. 
The result is very intuitive. Expected utility is increasing in                         so 
large payment, subsidy, discount factor on specific knowledge and productivity 
compensate for small initial specific knowledge. However, initial specific knowledge 
should be high enough to raise expected utility to outweigh reservation utility. Stock of 
specific knowledge in Stage I is increasing in          by its definition. Agents would 
like to invest more in specific knowledge when piece rate payment and subsidy and 
productivity are increasing. 
To induce investment on physical asset, i.e.,                           
    
                      
                                                                                                                     (11) 
Proposition 2: To induce investment on physical asset, the minimum initial human 
capital stock is decreasing in               , but increasing in        
Proof of Proposition 2: see Appendix. 9 
 
Expected utility is increasing in                         but expected utility with 
investment on physical asset increases more for the same amount increase in           
when initial specific knowledge is above some threshold.  
Stage II consists of finite repeated renewal periods. I’m interested in the point when 
agents stop renewal and before which the probability to renew is assumed to be 1 in each 
period. If agents don’t renew after Stage I, they take and run.  
The expected utility at the ending point is: 
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Differentiating with respect to    and    and rearrange to obtain optimal investment in 
human capital and effort: 
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If agents don’t renew in the first period         in Stage II, a Take-and-Run behavior 
shows up. In Stage II, the expected utility in the     period is not larger than the 
reservation utility in the     period, i.e.,                       equivalently,  
                                   
              
                                                  (16) 
                                                    
Result 1:  
(1) When there’s no loyalty subsidy, i.e.,      , agents take-and-run after Stage I if 
                                   As can be seen, the likelihood the Take-and-Run 
behavior will happen is the highest when no investment in physical capital in Stage I but 
in Stage II, the lowest when no investment in physical capital in either stage, and in the 
middle when investment occurs in Stage I.  
(2) When        and   is so large that     , the likelihood the Take-and-Run behavior 
will happen is larger when no investment in physical capital in Stage I but in Stage II 
than when investment occurs in Stage I.  
(3) Investment in both specific knowledge and effort is increasing in    Take-and-Run 
behavior causes underinvestment. 
 
Timing of the Loyalty Premium: 11 
 
One implication from the oil change decision example is that initial subsidy should be 
high enough to attract agents, but can’t be too high to encourage Take-and-Run. The 
ending bonus should be large enough to induce long term business.  
According to the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra, every polynomial with odd degrees 
has some real root. Hence, there’s at least a solution for  .  I want to show that    is 
monotonic increasing in   under certain conditions. Transferring some initial subsidy to 
the loyalty premium so that the expected utility is just larger than the agents’ reservation 
utility to adopt biomass and stay longer in the biomass industry.  
 
Testable Hypotheses: 
1. The likelihood to adopt biomass is high when agents have high initial specific 
knowledge in biomass production, when agents are eligible for initial subsidies, when 
contract payment is high, when agents previously invest in physical capital and etc. 
2.  The likelihood to abandon biomass production is high when agents don’t have 
equipment to harvest, store and transport biomass under high harvest, storage and 
transportation cost. 
 
Results and Conclusions: 
Under the principal-agent setting, I studied farmers’ biomass adoption decision under 
subsidies. I found that farmers who have initial specific knowledge in biomass production, 
are eligible for initial subsidies and previously invest in physical assets needed in 12 
 
biomass production are more likely to adopt biomass. Increasing piece rate payment 
increases farmers’ willingness to adopt biomass and induces higher investment in specific 
knowledge and effort.  
More importantly, I found that the first group to quit biomass production is the ones who 
don’t have equipment to harvest, store and transport biomass when the costs associated 
with harvest, storage and transportation are high. Under certain conditions, a timely 
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Proof of Proposition 1:  
Assume the reservation utility exceeds the sum of the real fixed cost and base payment, 
i.e.,                               
Let       
                               
 
             
   
  
            
   
           
 
     
     
        
   
  
                 
              
  
     
The same for both   and      . 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
Let       
                      
                       
 
                      
                   
      
     
        
   
 
                        
 
                       
  
     







Table 1. Optimal Oil Change Path and Distribution/Timing of Ending Bonus 
Dealer  Ending Bonus  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  Yes  25  35  35  35  0  - 
Ms. Wang  Yes  0  35  35  35  25  - 
  Yes  25  35  35  35  35  0 
   No  25  35  35  35  35  - 
Dr. Qin  No  30  30  30  30  30  30 
 